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and that of medicine. The Feldstein
court looked to a previous case,
Frahm v. Urkovich, 447 N.E.2d
1007 (Ill. 1983), which ruled that the
practice of law was too distinct from
commercial practices to be covered
by the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act.
In Evanston Hospitalv. Crane,
627 N.E.2d 29 (111. App. Ct. 1993),
an Illinois appellate court again
denied the application of the Illinois
Consumer Fraud Act to medical
services, based in part on the Frahm
decision. On the basis of Frahm,the
Evanston Hospitalcourt "found a
distinction between professional
malpractice and the type of commercial misdeeds guarded against by the
Consumer Fraud Act.' This included
the practice of medicine, which the

court found to be outside the scope
of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act.

Counterdaim
inappropriate
The Hamptoncourt found the
New Jersey and Illinois decisions to
be consistent. The Hampton court
reasoned that precedent existed in
New Jersey to find certain professions as falling outside of the scope
of the Act. The court found that the
Illinois Consumer Fraud Act was
quite similar in both intent and
substance to the New Jersey Act and
that there was persuasive authority
in Illinois holding that medical
professionals should be excluded
from coverage under the Act. Based

on these findings, the court granted
summary judgment in favor of the
plaintiff on the matter of the
Bresans' counterclaim. Thus, the
Bresans' may not sue Hampton
under the New Jersey Consumer
Fraud Act.
The Bresans also attempted to
file a claim of duress. The Bresans
maintained that they would have
filed it at the appropriate time, e.g.,
with their counterclaim, but for the
trial court's mistakes. The Bresans
claimed that it was the trial court's
duty to inform them that their claim
under the Act was not valid so that
they would have an opportunity to
amend the duress claim. However,
the court ruled that the Bresans' line
of reasoning was "simply without
merit."

Retailer at U.S.-Mexico border loses battle against
Levi Strauss for misrepresentation and lost profits
claims
by HeatherSullivan
In Griffith v. Levi Strauss & Co., 85 E3d 185
(5th Cir. 1996), retailers brought suit against Levi
Strauss & Co. ("Levi") for lost profits resulting from
Levi's failure to inform the retailers that Levis distribution policy forbidding wholesale marketing allowed for
an exception at the U.S.-Mexico border. The retailers
sought recovery on five claims: (1) misrepresentation in
violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act; (2)
breach of duty under Texas contract law; (3) negligent
misrepresentation; (4) violation of the "catch-all"
provision of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act;
and (5) misrepresentation as to the sponsorship, characteristics, or benefits of the goods or services. The district
court dismissed the suit based on the claims of misrepresentation and breach of duty. The appellate court
affirmed the lower court's rulings and rejected the
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additional claims raised on appeal.
The appellants, Ken and Renee Griffith ("Griffiths"),
doing business as "Mr. Fashion," were retail merchants
for Levi Strauss & Co. ("Levi"). Levi terminated the
Griffiths' contract when the Griffiths began selling
Levi's product on a wholesale basis. Under the contract,
the Griffiths were bound to Levi's "distribution policy"
which provided that Levi retailers may not sell Levi
products to other resellers. If a Levi retailer transferred
Levi products from an approved to non-approved
location, Levi reserved the right to terminate the
business relationship.
The Griffiths filed a lawsuit against Levi, alleging
that Levi failed to inform them of the distribution
policy's "border exception:' The "border exception"
provided that the standard rule prohibiting wholesale
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transactions did not apply to sales at the U.S.-Mexico
border. The Griffiths claimed damages for lost profits,
arguing that Levi's failure to inform them of the "border
exception" deprived them of profits they could have
earned because the Griffith's business was located at the
U.S.-Mexico border.

"Border exception" outside framework of
agreement
The first claim of misrepresentation was based on
Section 17.46(b)(12) of the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices Act ("DTPA"), which makes it an unlawful
deceptive trade practice to represent "that an agreement
confers or involves rights, remedies, or obligations
which it does not have or involve, or which are prohibited by law." Under this claim, the Griffiths asserted that
Levi was liable for misrepresentation based on failure to
apprise them of the border exception. The appellants
also sought liability under Texas contract law and
alleged that Levi breached the duty of good faith in
performing the contract by omitting information
pertaining to the border exception. The district court
held that the border exception formed no part of the
contract; thus, the court dismissed the suit for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The
appellate court agreed and noted that under both claims,
liability only arises if the false representation and the
breach of duty have been included within the framework
of the agreement. In other words, there must be some
reference to the border exception in the contract according to the appellate court. The court recognized that no
part of the Levi-Griffith contract mentioned the border
exception; therefore, Levi did not misrepresent any term
or breach any contractual duty.
On appeal, the Griffiths further alleged that Levi's
failure to inform the Griffiths of the border exception
constituted negligent misrepresentation. The Griffiths
alleged that Levi misrepresented its distribution policy
because Levi misguided them into believing that Levi
prohibited them from selling Levi products on a wholesale basis. The court disagreed, stating that the distribution policy reserved Levi's right to terminate accounts
with wholesale retailers and specifically provided Levi
the option not to terminate. Therefore, Levi's representation about the distribution policy was not false because
Levi permitted some retailers to sell on a wholesale
basis without termination.
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"Catch-all" provision of Texas Deceptive
Trade Practices Act not applicable to
private cause of action
The Griffiths' next theory of recovery was based on
the "catch all" provision in § 17.46(b) of the Texas
DTPA which provides that "the term 'false, misleading,
or deceptive acts or practices' includes, but is not limited
to the following acts..." However, the court declared
that this provision did not apply to the Griffiths because
a claim must be specifically enumerated in § 17.46 to
maintain a private cause of action. The court cited
Penningtonv. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 687 (Tex.
1980), in which the court examined the policies and
legislative intent behind the DTPA. The Pennington
court pointed out that § 17.44 of the DTPA provides that
it "shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its
underlying purposes, which are to protect consumers
against false, misleading, and deceptive business
practices, unconscionable actions, and breaches of
warranty and to provide efficient and economical
procedures to secure such protection." To discourage
deceptive trade practices, the legislature included §
17.50 to provide a cause of action for mandatory treble
damages. However, under § 17.50(a)(1)(A), a consumer
may maintain a private cause of action only where
"specifically enumerated in a subdivision of subsection
(b) of section 17.46." Consequently, in Griffith, the court
held that the "catch-all" provision claim failed because a
private cause of action does not exist under the DTPA.

Retailer fails to qualify as a "consumer"

under Texas law
The Griffiths' final claim for relief alleged that Levi
violated §1 7.46(b)(5) of DTPA by misrepresenting the
sponsorship, characteristics or benefits of the goods or
services. To recover under the DTPA, a plaintiff must
establish that he is a "consumer" A "consumer" is "an
individual ... who seeks or acquires by purchase or
lease, any goods or services." Eve L. Pouliot & William
Christopher Carmody, Deceptive Trade PracticesAct, 48
SMU L. REV. 1113, 1114 (1995). Although a consumer
is an "individual" within the statue, Texas recognizes
that small businesses can be consumers. Texas is one of
two states which specifically provides businesses a wide
range of rights and privileges under its state's FTC Act.
Toward GreaterEquality in Business Transactions:A
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Proposalto Extend the Little FTCActs to Small Businesses, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1621, 1634 (1983). Thus, the
DTPA applies to commercial transactions of businesses
of all sizes. Id. at 1636. The reasoning behind this policy
is that transactions involving wholesalers and retailers
have elements of both consumer and business transactions. Id. at 1631. For example, small businesses often
deal with the same suppliers that serve consumers, and
the boundary between consumer goods and business
purchases is not always clear. Id. Therefore, Texas
recognizes that small businesses can be consumers;
however, this classification only exists if the business
acquires goods or services. Id.

The Griffiths did not acquire any goods or services
and, therefore, did not fit the classification of "consumer." The appellate court looked to Penningtonand
determined that any misrepresentation by Levi, to be
actionable, must pertain to the goods or services that the
Griffiths acquired from Levi. In this case, the Griffiths
sold their services as retailers to Levi; however, they
acquired nothing from Levi. Therefore, the Griffiths did
not fall within the scope of protection under the DTPA.
In conclusion, the appellate court affirmed the
judgment of the district court in dismissing the complaint and holding that the Griffiths' were not entitled to
recovery on any claim.

Alleged "kickbacks" do not violate RICO
by PhilipJ. Tortorich
Recently, the Northern District of
Illinois held that Mercury Finance
Co. did not violate the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") when it bought a
finance contract at a lower rate than
indicated to the customer. Perino v.
Mercury FinanceCo., 912 F. Supp.
313 (N. D. Ill. 1995).
On May 20, 1993, Joseph Perino
("Perino") purchased a car from
Mancari Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.
("Mancari"). Mancari arranged
financing for Perino with Mercury
Finance Company ("MFC"). Perino
was inforfmed that the annual
percentage rate ("APR") from MFC
was 41.04%. After Perino signed the
contract, MFC purchased the
contract from Mancari at a lower
rate than that quoted to Perino. The
two companies split the difference
between the two rates; for example,
if MFC purchased the contract back
("buy rate") from Mancari for
roughly 30%, then MFC and
Mancari would split the 10%
difference between the APR and the
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buy rate. Neither MFC nor Mancari
disclosed this discounted transaction
to Perino. About a year after signing,
Perino became disabled and unable
to make regular payments on the
installment contract. A few months
later, MFC repossessed Perino's car
even though Perino attempted to
make payments through his disability insurance. Consequently, Perino
filed a complaint in federal court
which alleged that MFC violated
RICO and the mail fraud statute
along with several other state law
claims. MFC moved to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a cause
of action.

RICO claim dismissed
The heart of Perino's claim was
that MFC adopted a policy of
entering into "secret agreements"
with Mancari and other dealers in
which: (1) MFC purchased retail
installment contracts at a rate less
than the rate at which the purchaser
had originally signed; (2) MFC

allowed the dealers to charge their
customers more than MFC's interest
rates to the dealers; (3) MFC and the
dealers would split the difference;
and (4) the dealers' customers would
not be told that the dealers kept the
difference. Perino contended that
MFC's "kickback" scheme violated
RICO. The court disagreed.
The court held that the
defendant's conduct was neither
fraudulent nor an illegal "kickback."
Perino's allegations focused on the
fact that MFC never disclosed the
activity to the customer. The court
noted that disclosure issues are
resolved under the Truth-in-Lending
Act ("TILA"), which does not
require disclosures of the sort
alleged. The TILA only requires that
a customer be informed of: (1) the
name of the creditor, (2) the amount
financed; and (3) the APR. MFC
fulfilled all of the required disclosures. Furthermore, the court held
that the discounted sale was specifically authorized by, and in compliance with, the TLA.
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